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PASCAL'S WAGER AND THE PROBLEM 
OF INFINITE UTILITIES 
Jeffrey Jordan 
In this paper, I identify two versions of an objection to Pascal's Wager which 
claims that any calculation of expected utility which involves infinite utilities 
will result in a situation of rational indeterminacy. One version holds that the 
use of infinite utilities results in a decisional indeterminacy since any option 
which offers an infinite payoff would also have an infinite expected utility. 
The other version contends that whenever one includes infinite disutilities as 
well as infinite utilities in a calculation of expected utility, a mathematical 
indeterminacy results. I argue that neither version of this "indeterminacy 
objection" is fatal to the Wager since a Pascalian can augment utility maxi-
mization with certain other plausible decision-theoretic principles in order to 
resolve the indeterminacies. 
A common objection to Pascal's Wager is based on its use of the notion of 
an infinite utility.l This objection consists in the charge that a calculation of 
expected utility which uses an infinite utility will always result in a rational 
indeterminacy. Mathematical expectation, that is, when infinite utilities are 
used, provides no guide for choosing between different courses of action. 
In what follows I identify two versions of this indeterminacy objection to 
Pascal's Wager. One version argues that a decisional indeterminacy would 
result whenever one holds that several different decision options offer an 
infinite utility. The other version of the objection contends that a mathemat-
ical indeterminacy arises from the use of infinite utilities in a calculation of 
expected utilities. Neither version, I argue, is fatal to the use of infinite 
utilities in Pascalian wagers. I will argue that if Pascal's Wager fails, then 
this is due to some objection other than the alleged problem of infinite 
utilities. 
An examination of the indeterminacy objection has one other interesting 
result: it shows that the standard version of the Wager, if it is to have any 
cogency, must be augmented by certain decision-theoretic principles. These 
principles are the subjects of sections two and three. I begin with a brief 
discussion of the place of infinite utilities in Pascal's Wager. 
I 
The basic idea of the Wager, simply put, is that if God exists, then the 
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consequence for the believer is infinite; while if God does not exist, the loss 
for both the believer and the unbeliever is but finite. Since the pay-off of 
belief is greater than non-belief, one has a good reason to try to bring about 
theistic belief.2 The Wager, unlike, say, Anselm's ontological argument, does 
not attempt to provide an epistemic reason for theistic belief. The Wager 
attempts to provide a prudential reason for belief. A prudential reason is a 
reason to think some belief beneficia!.3 An epistemic reason would be, 
roughly, a reason to think a belief true or likely. Given that the evidence is 
inconclusive, Pascal argues, one can properly consult prudence: "Your reason 
suffers no more violence in choosing one rather than the other ... but what 
about your happiness? Let us weigh the gain and the loss involved by wager-
ing that God exists."4 According to Pascal, theistic belief, because of its 
promised pay-off, dominates its doxastic competitor of non-belief. This con-
clusion is arrived at via what has come to be known as 'the mathematical 
theory of expectations.' 
The mathematical expectation of an act A is determined by multiplying the 
utility of each outcome of A with its associated probability, summing the 
results, and then subtracting any cost attached to A.5 So, to take a simple 
example, suppose one could wager on only one of either horse A or horse B, 
where the probability of A winning is PI and that of B is p2. The pay-offs of 
A and B, respectively, are a and b, and the costs of wagering are respectively 
Cl and C2. The expected utility (EU) of betting on A would be determined by: 
A. [probability x utility] - cost = EU 
According to the mathematical theory of expectations, as long as (pia - Cl) ~ 
(p2b - C2), it is rational to bet on A. The justification for this claim is the 
principle of utility maximization: in a decision situation, where both proba-
bility values and utility values can be assigned, one should choose to do that 
act which has the greatest expected utility. 
The utility of an act consists of the benefits which would result if that act 
obtains.6 A benefit could conceivably be anything valued by the agent. A loss 
(or disutility) would be anything considered undesirable to the agent. The 
probability assignments PI and P2, found in the example above, are subjective 
estimations of the relative likelihood that A or B will win. Of course, the 
mathematical theory of expectations does not require that the probability 
values used be of the subjective sort, though this is the sort of probability 
which lends itself most readily to Pascal's Wager. 
There are two ways of generating an infinite expected utility. The first is 
by means of an outcome which is itself valued infinitely by an agent. An 
infinite utility would result whenever one has an unbounded preference for 
a certain possible outcome obtaining. If there were something X which a 
person valued infinitely, then there would be no finitely valued thing which 
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that person preferred to X or was indifferent to regarding X. Provided that 
one assigns some outcome an infinite utility, that outcome will dominate all 
its competitors. That is, no matter how small the probability assigned (as long 
as it is non-zero), an outcome with an infinite utility will always have a 
greater expected utility than any outcome which has only a finite utility. This 
first way we could term the 'qualitative' sense of an infinite expected utility. 
The second way involves an infinite sequence of possible finite pay-offs. This 
second way is found, for example, in the St. Petersburg game where a fair 
coin is tossed repeatedly until that toss n upon which 'Heads' first appears, 
at which time one is paid 2n dollars. The probability of a fair coin coming up 
'Heads' on the first toss is 0.5 and the pay-off in that case is 21 and so the 
expected utility of that one toss would be (1/2)2. Since a fair coin logically 
could always come up 'Tails,' we have the non-convergent series: 
(1/2)2 + (1/4)4 + (1/8)8 + (1/16)16 ... = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1... 
which sums to infinity. Here there is nothing which is itself valued infinitely; 
only a series of pay-offs which, since it has no mathematical limit, sums to 
infinity. Unlike the first way, the second way offers no infinite pay-off: there 
would never be an infinite pay-off possible given the second way, only a 
possible unlimited supply of finite pay-offs. This we could term the 
'quantitative' sense of an infinite expected utility. 
The Pascalian notion of an infinite utility can be seen as a combination of 
these two ways. The theistic notion of an afterlife is of an everlasting, happy 
existence in the presence of God. This notion is quantitative in that the citizen 
of heaven has an everlasting (endless) existence: one has, as it were, an 
unlimited supply of 'happy utiles.' And this notion is qualitative in that this 
happiness is not only unlimited, it is also nondiminishing and complete: each 
moment lacks nothing which is necessary for happiness and each moment is 
as saturated in felicity as the preceding one. Though sketched only in its 
barest terms, this is, I think, something like what Pascal meant by the claim 
that the theist gains, if God exists, "an infinity of an infinitely happy life to 
win."7 Such an existence, an infinity of an infinitely happy life, would cer-
tainly seem preferable to any finite thing of value. 
The standard expected-utility version of Pascal's Wager, briefly put, argues 
that as long as some positive probability is assigned to the existence of God, 
the expected utility of the act of theistic belief will dominate the expected 
utility of any non-belief option. So, suppose that S thought it unlikely that 
God exists; let's say, she assigns a 0.6 probability to the claim that God does 
not exist. The EU of the act of non-belief would be: 
B. [(0.6) (5) + (0.4) (5)] = 5 
where S assigns a value of five utiles to living life as she would, whether or 
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not God exists, free of any religious inhibitions or burden of belief. g And 
since S believes that there is no penalty assigned to one who does not believe 
even if God does exist, there is also a five attached to that outcome.9 The EU 
of the act of belief though, even for S, would be: 
C. [(0.4) (00) + (0.6) (-5)] = 00 
where '00' represents an infinite utility. 10 Because there is an infinite pay-off 
to be had if one believes and it turns out that God does exist, then the EU of 
religious belief dominates: because EU(C) > EU(B), a Bayesian calculation 
recommends, and would always recommend, the act of religious belief over 
that of non-belief. 
Without an infinite expected utility, a Pascalian wager would recommend 
religious belief in some cases, but possibly not in all cases. The act of reli-
gious belief would not dominate its doxastic competitors and so the proba-
bility of God's existence would become a much more important component 
of the calculation. As it stands, given the Pascalian assumptions of an infinite 
pay-off to be awarded belief if God exists, a non-zero probability assigned 
to the existence of God, and but a finite cost attached to religious belief, 
Pascal will have his conclusion that one should try to bring about theistic 
belief. 
II 
The objection that the notion of an infinite utility is problematic because an 
indeterminacy always results can be formulated in a couple of different ways. 
One way argues that a decisional indeterminacy arises whenever one holds 
that it is possible that different acts might result in an infinite gain. The other 
way contends that a mathematical indeterminacy could arise even with acts 
considered in isolation. I begin with the former. 
Suppose an agent believes that she can make the prospect of heaven more 
or less likely by doing one of two acts. Act one the agent takes to have a 0.5 
probability of bringing it about that heaven is achieved. Act two has but a 
0.001 probability of the same end. It seems quite natural that the agent should 
prefer the performance of act one over act two; but, when one calculates the 
expected utility of each act, they both have the same EU. The mathematical 
expectation of act one is: 
1. [(0.5) (00) + (0.5) (0)] = 00. 
The calculation for act two is: 
2. [(0.001) (00) + (0.999) (0)] = 00. 
The problem is obvious: EU(1) = EU(2). When the utility is taken to be 
infinite and the cost finite, then, no matter how small the positive probability, 
the expected utility is always infinite. To compound matters, the argument 
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can be extended: any and every act has some probability, no matter how small, 
of resulting in religious belief and thus bringing about heaven. Every act, 
then, would have an infinite expected utility. As Antony Duff puts it: 
... suppose I take no steps to make it more likely that I will come to believe 
in God. There must still be some probability, however small, that I will 
nonetheless come to believe in Him ... and that probability is enough to gen-
erate an infinite expected value for my actions. II 
Given that every course of action has some probability of resulting in theistic 
belief; and given that an infinite value multiplied by a finite value, no matter 
how small, generates an infinite value, one may conclude that the inclusion 
of infinite utilities in a calculation of expected utility results in mathematical 
expectation being rendered useless as a means of decision resolution. 
This objection is vulnerable to the following response. Unlike Buridan's 
ass, the agent in the example does have a good reason to prefer act one over 
act two, and, further, this is the case even when the expected utilities are the 
same. Act one makes it more likely that the pay-off will be obtained and so 
is quite properly preferable on that score. That is, the principle that: 
D. when each available incompatible act AI, A2, A3, ... , An has an infinite 
expected utility and all other things are equal, one should perfonn that 
act A which is considered the most likely to bring about the pay-off 
is plausible. The provision, all other things are equal, though formulated 
rather generally, is meant to exclude from the scope of (D) those cases in 
which the utility assignments may be decisive. For example, imagine a case 
where an act, AI, has an infinite EU and is also the most probable option of 
those that have an infinite EU, but carries some risk of a great loss (disutility). 
A2 also has an infinite EU, is just somewhat less probable than AI> but has 
no risk of a great disutility. As described A2 may well be preferable to AI. 
A2, we could say, because of its utility assignment, overrides the (otherwise) 
attractiveness of AI which was due to its somewhat greater probability.12 
Since act one and act two both have an infinite EU, following (D), one 
should choose to perform act one because that act makes the attainment of 
the pay-off more likely. The decision to perform act one, then, properly rests 
not only on its EU but also on its probability. The addition of (D) as a 
tie-breaking principle of calculation circumvents the alleged decisional inde-
terminacy of infinite expected utilities. 
III 
The second way of formulating the objection that the use of infinite utilities 
results in an indeterminacy would proceed without the claim that different 
acts are necessary in order to generate an indeterminacy. 13 Without different 
acts, (D) is inapplicable. So, suppose that an agent believes that a certain act 
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B (where B is belief in the theistic god) has a 0.45-x probability of bringing 
about an infinite outcome (heaven), a 0.55 probability of no afterlife and a 
very remote probability of resulting in an infinite disutility (hell). The EU of 
B would be: 
3. [(0.45-x) (00) + (0.55) (r) + (x) (_00)] = 00 + _00 
where 'r' is a finite utility and 'x' is some non-zero probability which is very 
small. Proposition (3) is, quite obviously, problematic in that subtraction is 
not well defined for infinite cardinals. The EU of B is mathematically inde-
terminate. 
This is, by the way, a version of the most popular criticism offered against 
the Wager: the 'many-gods' objection. 14 In other words, (3) includes not only 
the utilities and probabilities of the respective outcomes for a belief in God, 
contingent on God's existence; it also includes an outcome in which some 
deity other than God exists, such that this other deity punishes with an infinite 
disutility all those who believe in God. 
Though it is true that (3) results in a mathematical indeterminacy, it is not 
clear why (3) might be thought to be a problem for the notion of infinite 
utilities. Clearly there is a problem with (3) as it stands, but why should one 
think this is so generally? One plausible response to the indeterminacy found 
in (3) involves the removal of the infinite disutility (_00) from the calculation. 
Without the infinite disutility, (3) would yield, of course, a determinate value. 
The justification for this removal is as follows. Every act has an infinite 
number of logically possible outcomes; and consequently, every act has an 
infinite number of possible outcomes which are properly ignored or removed 
from the decision calculation.l~ For example, when tossing a coin, though 
one justifiably takes the only possible outcomes to be 'Heads' and 'Tails,' in 
fact any number of bizarre but possible events might occur: the coin might 
land on its edge, it may remain suspended in mid-air, the coin might vanish 
as it is tossed, and so on. In a similar way, a Pascalian could hold that the 
likelihood of there being a god who punishes all and only theists with an 
infinite disutility, is so wildly remote that it is properly ignored. 16 
It is important to notice that one cannot remove the infinite disutility just 
because it, along with the infinite utility, leads to an indeterminacy. The 
removal of the infinite disutility is permissible because the outcome associ-
ated with it (there being this other sort of god) is thought to be so remote, so 
unlikely, that it warrants nothing but neglect. 
One might think that the removal of the infinite disutility from (3) is 
impermissible just because there is an infinite value involved. That is, in most 
decision situations which have outcomes with vanishingly small probabilities, 
one can ignore those outcomes because, when multiplied by a finite utility, 
these outcomes would contribute only a very tiny amount to the overall 
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expected utility. This amount, because it is so small, is irrelevant. So, with 
the coin toss, the probability of the outcome in which the coin lands on its 
edge is so small that that outcome is really not worth the notice. But in the 
case of (3) things are rather different. There we have not a finite utility 
involved, but an infinite one. And since infinity multiplied by any finite 
amount yields an infinity, the amount which results would clearly not be 
irrelevant. 
Though the foregoing objection might seem plausible, it is erroneous in 
that it neglects an important point. Every act carries with it possible outcomes 
which involve infinite utilities. Just as any and every act might result in 
religious belief and so might result in an infinite utility, there might be, for 
any act one picks, some bizarre god who punishes the doer of that act with 
an infinite disutility. The probability of this is no doubt vanishingly small, 
but a non-zero probability is sufficient when multiplied with an infinite value 
to render an infinite value. Hence, any and every act carries the sort of 
indeterminacy found in (3). So, just as we properly neglect very remote 
possibilities in mundane decisions, we are justified in doing so in Pascalian 
decisions also. 
The neglect of very remote catastrophic outcomes is not, then, unique to 
the Pascalian. It is a maneuver which is both common and rational. 17 But once 
that point is recognized, it is clear that the indeterminacy found in (3) is not 
incurable. The prescription is a good dose of partition exclusion: limiting the 
outcome in one's decision matrix to real outcomes only.IS That which is 
merely possible and wildly improbable is properly neglected and, paraphras-
ing William James, left for "dead."19 
On the other hand, suppose that one assigned the following values in a 
calculation of expected utility: 
(4) [(0.44) (=) + (0.55) (r) + (0.01) (-=)] = = + -=. 
Proposition (4) differs from (3) in that the probability assignment associated 
with the infinite disutility is much greater than is the case with (3). The 
indeterminacy in (4) cannot be removed in the manner outlined above, simply 
because the relevant outcomes involved are all considered as real, as rela-
tively likely possibilities. If one considers outcomes associated with both 
infinite utilities and infinite disutilities as real possibilities in a calculation 
of expected utility, then the indeterminacy is not properly removable as is 
the case with (3). Nevertheless, I see no reason to think that (4) is a problem 
which shows that any use of an infinite utility in a Pascalian wager will result 
in a situation of mathematical indeterminacy. While it is true that certain 
expected-utility uses of infinite values may result in debilitating mathemati-
cal indeterminacies, it is also clear that other uses, like that of (3), need not. 
One might wonder if the probability assignments found in (3) are realistic. 
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Is there any reason to suppose that there might be circumstances in which it 
would be rational to have the probabilities specified in (3)? A use of the 
principle of indifference, for instance, would not yield the probability dispar-
ities found in (3). The two deity hypotheses seem a priori similar. So, the use 
of the principle of indifference would sanction assigning the two hypotheses 
equal probabilities. If the two deity hypotheses have equiprobable assign-
ments, then the probability disparity which is necessary to remove the "of-
fending" infinite utility assignment will be missing. 
Though it is true that a use of the indifference principle will not yield the 
probability assignments found in (3), the probability assignments in (3) would 
be realistic and rational given other sorts of evidence. For instance, suppose 
that, after reflecting on the various arguments, pro and con, concerning the 
existence of God, one judges that the evidence is roughly balanced. Further, 
this person decides that, if there is a god, it most probably would be the 
theistic god (though one is willing to admit that it is possible that one could 
be wrong about this, that there might exist some deity other than God).20 With 
regard to the evidence, this person would be in an agnostic position: this 
person judges that the evidence is roughly balanced.21 This is, by the way, a 
general description of the sort of individual for whom Pascal original\y wrote 
the Pensees: a lapsed theistic believer who, if she will consider any religious 
hypothesis, will consider only the theistic one. The probabilities specified in 
(3) reflect the assignments of a person who sees theism and a purely natural-
istic outcome as being the only real outcomes. 
The Wager, under this view, is not a free-floating argument designed to 
demonstrate the rationality of theistic belief, no matter what the positive 
probability is which one assigns to theism. The Wager is, rather, a sort of 
tie-breaker: if one judges that there is an epistemic parity between theism and 
naturalism, the Wager can tip the scales in favor of belief. Because the 
expected utility of theistic belief is greater than that of non-belief and because 
the relevant evidence is roughly balanced, it is reasonable to believe. This 
view of the Wager is, briefly, that the Wager (a consideration of prudential 
rationality) is operative only if the evidence (epistemic rationality) is not 
conclusive. The theoretical advantage of this view is that the Wager could 
not be contrary to epistemic rationality, it could only supplement the evi-
dence. 22 The Wager needs, then, the support of other arguments in order to 
justify the probability assignments (like those found in (1) and (3» which are 
necessary if it is to have a chance at plausibility. The Wager needs, in a sense, 
the rest of the Pensees in order to work.23 
It is clear, I think, that the probability assignments of (3) are realistic and 
rational, given the sort of description found above. Indeed, many persons in 
contemporary society would fit this description: persons who are agnostic 
about the existence of God, but who think that the only real outcomes are 
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theism and naturalism. The Wager could be a good reason for them to believe, 
even if it is not a good reason for the convinced atheist. 
IV 
As things stand, the indeterminacy objection in both its versions fails to show 
that a Pascalian use of an infinite utility is problematic. The objection does 
show that the standard expected-utility version of the Wager must be aug-
mented, at least in some cases, with other decision-theoretic principles. 
Though this decision-theoretic augmentation renders the wager argument a 
bit more complex than Pascal's original formulation, this is hardly reason to 
think the wager argument fallacious. 24 Consequently, if Pascal's Wager fails, 
it does so due to some problem other than the indeterminacy objection. 25 
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